Beyond flight and rescue: the migration setting of German Jewry before 1938 by Juenger, David
Beyond flight and rescue: the migration setting of German 
Jewry before 1938
Article  (Accepted Version)
http://sro.sussex.ac.uk
Juenger, David (2019) Beyond flight and rescue: the migration setting of German Jewry before 
1938. Dubnow Institute Yearbook, 16 (2017). pp. 173-197. 
This version is available from Sussex Research Online: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/84411/
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies and may differ from the 
published  version or from the version of record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to 
consult the publisher’s version. Please see the URL above for details on accessing the published 
version. 
Copyright and reuse: 
Sussex Research Online is a digital repository of the research output of the University.
Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and practicable, the material 
made available in SRO has been checked for eligibility before being made available. 
Copies of full text items generally can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third 
parties in any format or medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge, provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic 
details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the 
content is not changed in any way. 
1 
 
David Jünger 
 
Beyond Flight and Rescue: 
The Migration Setting of German Jewry before 1938 
 
The year 1938 marked a turning point in the political course of Nazi Germany: 
Until then, German Jews had been humiliated, deprived of their rights as 
German citizens, and driven into poverty. But immediately after the 
annexation of Austria in March 1938, the Nazi regime began to expel Austrian 
Jews and, a few months later, during the Polenaktion, about 20,000 Jews of 
Eastern European origin from the so-called Altreich. Those who were left on 
German territory, fled after the November pogroms. The politics of 
disenfranchisement had been replaced by a politics of expulsion, enforced 
against a community of people who, for their part, had nowhere left to go.1 
The world had closed its doors for those Jews desperately trying to escape the 
grip of Nazi German persecution.2 
Looking back at this year and the desperate plight of the German and 
Austrian Jews, scholars as well as the public have raised many pressing and 
haunting questions: Why had the German Jews not escaped when it was still 
possible? Why stood the world idly by when a whole group of close to a 
million human beings were under the attack of a racist, murderous regime? 
And consequently: How many more could have been saved if the German 
                                                 
1 Peter Longerich, Holocaust. The Nazi Persecution and Murder of the Jews, Oxford/New 
York 2010, 95–130.  
2 For the Nazi policies towards the Jews, see Uwe Dietrich Adam, Judenpolitik im Dritten 
Reich, Düsseldorf 1972; Saul Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, vol. 1: The Years of 
Persecution, 1933–1939, New York 1997; ibid., vol. 2: The Years of Extermination, 1939–
1945, New York 2007; Longerich, Holocaust; Susanne Heim, “Deutschland muß ihnen ein 
Land ohne Zukunft sein.” Die Zwangsemigration der Juden 1933 bis 1938, in: Christoph 
Dieckmann (ed.), Arbeitsmigration und Flucht. Vertreibung und Arbeitskräfteregulierung im 
Zwischenkriegseuropa, Göttingen 1993, 48–81. For the developments of 1938, see Dan Diner, 
Die Katastrophe vor der Katastrophe. Auswanderung ohne Einwanderung, in: idem/Dirk 
Blasius (eds.), Zerbrochene Geschichte. Leben und Selbstverständnis der Juden in 
Deutschland, Frankfurt a. M. 1991, 138–160; Joseph Tenenbaum, The Crucial Year 1938, in: 
Yad Vashem Studies 2 (1958), 49–77; Raphael Gross, November 1938. Die Katastrophe vor 
der Katastrophe, Munich 2013. 
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Jews, global Jewish organizations and the international community had acted 
at an appropriate pace and in a determined manner?3 
Those questions arise because we know what happened after 1938; 
because we know that Nazi Germany’s politics of expulsion was just another 
step towards their politics of ghettoization and finally: extermination. The 
monstrosity and tragedy of the Holocaust seem to lead inevitably to those 
fundamental questions: What could have been done and what has been 
missed? Whilst those questions are absolutely justified for the actual time the 
mass murder occurred, they are misleading if transplanted into the preceding 
years of the 1930s, as they assess persons and institutions at the time as if they 
knew what those developments were leading up to, or as if they reacted to the 
process that would later be understood as the Holocaust.  
While some contemporary publications about the Jewish situation in 
Germany and East Central Europe refer to certain events and developments of 
the 1930s as precursors of the Holocaust by book title alone,4 others make that 
connection more explicit, such as Joseph Marcus’ book Social and Political 
History of the Jews in Poland. When discussing, for instance the emigration of 
Polish Jews before the German conquest, he writes:  
 
“Of course, all Jews could not have left Poland, for even the time was far too 
short, but a substantially larger proportion might have escaped annihilation 
had the climate of Jewish political opinion and the general attitudes of Jewish 
                                                 
3 Until today, there have been innumerable studies addressing these questions, including, most 
notably: David Wyman, Paper Walls. America and the Refugee Crisis 1938–1941, Amherst, 
Mass. 1968; idem, The Abandonment of the Jews. America and the Holocaust, 1941–1945, 
New York 1984; Rafael Medoff, The Deafening Silence. American Jewish Leaders and the 
Holocaust, New York 1987; Monty Noam Penkower, The Jews Were Expendable. Free World 
Diplomacy and the Holocaust, Detroit 1988; Shabtai Beit Zvi, Post-Ugandan Zionism on 
Trial. A Study of the Factors that Caused the Mistakes Made by the Zionist Movement during 
the Holocaust, 2 vols., Tel Aviv 1991. The most recent and concise critique of those 
approaches offers Yehuda Bauer, Holocaust Rescue Revisited, in: Israel Journal of Foreign 
Affairs 7 (2013), no. 3., 127–142. A more comprehensive critique is presented by Henry L. 
Feingold, Bearing Witness. How America and Its Jews Responded to the Holocaust, Syracuse, 
NY, 1995. 
4 These include, for instance: Katharina Stengel (ed.), Vor der Vernichtung. Die staatliche 
Enteignung der Juden im Nationalsozialismus, Frankfurt a. M. 2007; Hagit Lavsky, Before 
Catastrophe. The Distinctive Path of German Zionism, Jerusalem 1996; Jerzy Tomaszewski, 
Auftakt zur Vernichtung. Die Vertreibung polnischer Juden aus Deutschland im Jahre 1938, 
Osnabrück 2002; Celia S. Heller, On the Edge of Destruction. Jews of Poland between the 
Two World Wars, New York 1977. 
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leaders been different from what they were. […] One cannot avoid the thought 
that, if emigration had been tackled with the necessary resolution by a united 
effort of Jewish leaders and organisations in the West and in the affected 
countries of the East, many thousands of Jews would have survived the war.”5  
 
This argument implies that the Jewish organizations of Poland and the 
Western hemisphere could have known that Poland would be invaded in the 
following years, and all its Jews murdered by the Germans. A similar line of 
argument can be found in other works about the German situation before the 
November pogroms of 1938, such as in Günther Schubert’s book on the 1933 
Haavara agreement between the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the Reich 
Ministry of Economics: This agreement, he writes, provided thousands of 
Jews with “an opportunity […] to leave Germany before they were swept 
away by the wave of destruction.”6 
As critical as these questions of flight and rescue might seem in 
retrospect, they are still driven by the benefit of historical hindsight and 
therefore anachronistic. The years before 1938 were undoubtedly dire times 
for European Jews. But contemporaries could hardly have foreseen that 
Germany’s anti-Jewish policies would escalate in mass expulsion and 
genocide, considering the complex historical setting that informed all 
considerations on Jewish migration in this period: the demise of liberalism and 
the upsurge of ethno-nationalism; the rise of authoritarian regimes in many 
European countries; the economic crisis and related shortage of financial 
means for emigration assistance; the tightening of national immigration 
regulations on a global scale; the sluggish progress in building up Jewish 
Palestine; the deterioration of the Jewish legal status in most of East Central 
Europe; the validity of the old concepts of emancipation in a modern world; or 
the decay of the interwar system of international cooperation – just to mention 
a few. German Jews, their leading representative institutions and international 
Jewish organizations engaged in migration assistance needed to take this entire 
setting into account when evaluating the German-Jewish situation. Given the 
                                                 
5 Joseph Marcus, Social and Political History of the Jews in Poland, 1919–1939, Berlin 1983, 
390 and 400.  
6 Günter Schubert, Erkaufte Flucht. Der Kampf um den Haavara-Transfer, Berlin 2009, 7. 
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multitude of problems awaiting comprehensive solutions, questions of flight 
and rescue of the German Jews were hardly a priority; nor did the dichotomy 
of staying versus leaving live up to the complexity of the situation.  
In discussing a variety of challenges faced by German Jews in the 
1930s that had little to do with Nazi anti-Jewish politics, this article questions 
a number of assumptions about Jewish migration problems of the time that are 
commonly shared in research today. To this end, it will emphasize two shifts 
in perspective: a temporal and a spatial one. An analysis of the background 
against which German Jews evaluated their situation should neither be limited 
to the domestic situation of Germany nor to the years 1933 to 1945, but extend 
to the wider international context of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century. Here, this implies the assessment of temporal and spatial 
preconditions determining later processes of evaluation under the Nazi regime. 
Consequently, reactions of the Western as well as the Jewish world to the 
different events of 1938 may be better understood, and moral judgment thereof 
more balanced.7  
 
The Spatial Shift: Challenges to European Migration 
For the German Jews, 1938 was with no doubt a year of international crisis. 
The Anschluss of Austria by Germany was one among many steps towards the 
revision of its national borders, and more generally the European territorial 
order created after World War I. Furthermore, the unregulated and violent 
expulsion of almost 200,000 Austrian Jews across German borders was meant 
as a warning to the world: Our “Jewish problem” will also soon be yours. The 
enormous attention the events of 1938 received by the international 
                                                 
7 There are a number of publications, which in one way or another share some basic ideas 
presented in this article: Dan Michman, Handeln und Erfahrung. Bewältigungsstrategien im 
Kontext der jüdischen Geschichte, in: Frank Bajohr/Andrea Löw (eds.), Der Holocaust. 
Ergebnisse und neue Fragen der Forschung, Bonn 2015, 255–277; Hagit Lavsky, The Creation 
of the German-Jewish Diaspora. Interwar German-Jewish Immigration to Palestine, the USA, 
and England, Berlin 2017; Doron Niederland, Jews from Germany. Emigrants or Refugees? 
Migration Patterns of German Jews between the Wars, Jerusalem 1996 (Hebr.); Guy Miron, 
The Waning of Emancipation. Jewish History, Memory, and the Rise of Fascism in Germany, 
France, and Hungary, Detroit, Mich., 2011; Diner, Die Katastrophe vor der Katastrophe; 
Frank Caestecker/Bob Moore (eds.), Refugees from Nazi Germany and the Liberal European 
States, New York/Oxford 2010. 
5 
 
community ended a long period of indifference and silence by both the 
politicians and media towards the German Jews that had set in after 1933.  
In April 1938, the American journalist Dorothy Thompson, who had 
been following the political developments in Nazi Germany from the 
beginning, wrote an article for Foreign Affairs, demanding tremendous 
international efforts to address, in her words, “a world problem.” In her view, 
the opinion that anti-Semitic persecution was a domestic issue needed to be 
abandoned immediately:  
 
“The responsible political circles in the world find it too ticklish a problem to 
tackle because it may imply interference in the internal affairs of the various 
countries and also because they are afraid that to raise the question of 
emigration might produce anti-Semitism in their own respective countries. 
[…] As anti-Semitic policies spread through Europe it becomes clearer and 
clearer that charity is not enough. The problem, it should be repeated, must be 
regarded and treated as one of international politics. The only approach to a 
solution must be a political approach. And, as things are at present, it can be 
made only by an organization headed by outstanding personalities of the 
democratic world, with the full collaboration of Jewish organizations 
everywhere, and enjoying the sympathetic collaboration and support of the 
democratic governments.”8 
 
As if responding directly to Thompson’s demands, the Evian Conference, 
convened by American President Franklin D. Roosevelt in July 1938, meant to 
demonstrate that the global scope of the situation and the need for 
international efforts had been understood.9 While the conference hardly 
yielded any tangible results, it achieved the internationalization of an issue that 
had been classified as domestic before.10 The subsequent establishment of the 
Intergovernmental Committee on Political Refugees at least ensured that the 
                                                 
8 Dorothy Thompson, Refugees. A World Problem, in: Foreign Affairs 16 (April 1938), no. 3, 
375–387, 386 f.  
9 Michael Mashberg, American Diplomacy and the Jewish Refugee, 1938–1939, in: Yivo 
Annual of Jewish Social Science 15 (1974), 339–365, here 340–342.  
10 Yehuda Bauer, My Brother’s Keeper. A History of the American Jewish Joint Distribution 
Committee 1929–1939, Philadelphia, Pa., 1974, 234–236.  
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persecution of the Jews remained on the agenda of international diplomacy 
henceforth.11  
Whereas the international dimension of 1938 seems to be 
unquestioned, research on the preceding years, however, is primarily focused 
on developments within Germany: the genesis of anti-Jewish politics by the 
Nazi regime, the pauperization of the German Jews, German-Jewish reactions 
to the Nazi onslaught, or emigration patterns of certain professions, such as 
lawyers, doctors or scientists. Regarding the so-called delayed emigration of 
German Jews, we are aware of many different factors leading to the alleged 
misapprehension of the Nazi regime’s goals and policies.12 However, many 
more insides can be gained by analyzing the Jewish assessment of the situation 
in Germany in its international dimension in the early 1930s. This includes an 
answer to the question why the persecution of the Jews by Nazi Germany – 
and de-facto revocation of “civilized standards” of the Western world – was 
not perceived as an event as unique as it appears to us today.  
However, many more insides can be gained by analyzing the Jewish 
assessment of the situation in Germany in its international dimension before 
1938. The era of European mass migration begun in the early 1870s, when the 
first larger groups of Jews left Romania and the Tsarist Empire. Figures 
skyrocketed in the following decades, as voluntary and forced migration in 
unprecedented scope and size, persecution of minorities, expulsion, 
irredentism, population transfer and exchange, pogroms, large-scale 
massacres, and even genocide became ubiquitous phenomena. Tens of 
                                                 
11 Fritz Kieffer, Judenverfolgung in Deutschland – eine innere Angelegenheit? Internationale 
Reaktionen auf die Flüchtlingsproblematik 1933–1939, Stuttgart 2002, 155–427; Ralph 
Weingarten, Die Hilfeleistung der westlichen Welt bei der Endlösung der deutschen 
Judenfrage. Das “Intergovernmental Committee on Political Refugees” (IGC) 1938–1939, 
Bern/Frankfurt a. M./New York 1981; Tommie Sjöberg, The Powers and the Persecuted. The 
Refugee Problem and the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR), 1938–1947, L 
and 1991. 
12 The most relevant references for the history of German Jewry are: Avraham Barkai/Paul 
Mendes-Flohr, Renewal and Destruction, 1918–1945, with an Epilogue by Steven M. 
Lowenstein, New York 1998; Wolfgang Benz (ed.), Die Juden in Deutschland 1933–1945. 
Leben unter nationalsozialistischer Herrschaft, Munich 1988; Friedländer, Nazi Germany and 
the Jews; Marion A. Kaplan, Between Dignity and Despair. Jewish Life in Nazi Germany, 
New York 1998; Francis R. Nicosia/David Scrase (eds.), Jewish Life in Nazi Germany. 
Dilemmas and Responses, New York 2010; Arnold Paucker (ed.), Die Juden im 
nationalsozialistischen Deutschland/The Jews in Nazi Germany 1933–1943, Tübingen 1986. 
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millions of people were on the move.13 Whereas the majority of migrants 
before World War I had come from Eastern and South Eastern Europe, the 
1920s and 1930s saw the mass migration of political refugees from 
persecution by nationalistic, authoritarian or fascist regimes across Europe:14 
Between 1922 and 1924, more than 1,5 million people fled Benito Mussolini’s 
fascist regime, leading to a staggering seven million Italians living abroad in 
1927; hundreds of thousands of Germans emigrated to mostly neighboring 
countries after 1933; and Austria’s fascist Dollfuss regime in Austria produced 
thousands of refugees. In 1936, a new conflict flared up: the Spanish Civil 
War. With the impending defeat of the Republican forces in the course of 
1938, another two million refugees crossed the border to France, and after 
Franco’s victory in 1939, hundreds of thousands more would follow.  
In Eastern Europe, the conditions for religious and ethnic minorities, 
and primarily the Jews, worsened dramatically during the 1930s. The Polish, 
Romanian, Hungarian, Lithuanian and Latvian Jews were incrementally 
deprived of their citizen rights, driven into poverty, attacked, humiliated and 
murdered in pogroms.15 The situation was worst in Poland. Ezra Mendelsohn 
describes the period between 1935 and 1939 as a downright “war against the 
Jews.”16 In 1936, ritual slaughter was prohibited by law, some universities 
established designated areas for Jews called “ghetto benches,” and in 1937, 
many professional associations introduced “Aryan” clauses into their 
membership regulations. A nationwide boycott of Jewish businesses did not 
only expose Jews to increasingly frequent acts of violence, but gave rise to the 
pauperization of the Polish Jewish community and thus struggle for their very 
                                                 
13 Michael Marrus, The Unwanted. European Refugees in the 20th Century, New York et al. 
1985; Tara Zahra, Great Departure. Mass Migration from Eastern Europe and the Making of 
the Free World, New York/London 2016, 23–104; Peter Gatrell, The Making of the Modern 
Refugee, Oxford 2015; Tony Kushner/Katharine Knox, Refugees in an Age of Genocide. 
Global, National and Local Perspectives during the Twentieth Century, London et al. 1999.  
14 For more on this movement and the following figures, see Marrus, The Unwanted, 123–157; 
Kushner/Knox, Refugees in an Age of Genocide, 103–171.  
15 Ezra Mendelsohn, The Jews of East Central Europe between the World Wars, Bloomington, 
Ind., 1983; Bauer, My Brother’s Keeper, 180–222; Bela Vago/George L. Mosse (eds.), Jews 
and Non-Jews in Eastern Europe, 1918–1945, New York 1975; Emanuel Melzer, No Way 
Out. The Politics of Polish Jewry 1935–1939, Cincinnati, Oh., 1997; Marcus, Social and 
Political History of the Jews in Poland, 349–386.  
16 Mendelsohn, The Jews of East Central Europe between the World Wars, 73.  
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survival.17 After 1936, anti-Jewish pogroms became “a common occurrence” 
in Poland.18 
By the mid-1930s, the situation in Eastern Europe had deteriorated to a 
level that made many contemporaries fear the end of Eastern European, if not 
world Jewry. Many Jewish voices predicted the impending destruction of East 
European and henceforth World Jewry. Nazi Germany and its anti-Jewish 
politics were only a part, and by far not the most significant one, of those fears 
and sinister predictions. Rabbi Dr. Joshua Then of Poland19 or Polish-Jewish 
sociologist and demographer Jakob Lestschinsky, tried to alert the world to the 
catastrophe that was slowly unfolding in Poland and called on colleagues to 
respond urgently to what they perceived as “a crisis of World Jewry”20 
describing the alarming situation that “3,500,000 Polish Jews are literally on 
the verge of the abyss.”21 Those warnings were no exceptions but the rule, and 
they had dire consequences for the whole Jewish migration system in interwar 
Europe.  
By 1935, Poland had taken Germany’s place, at least in the eyes of the 
public, as the most hostile anti-Jewish environment. At a conference of Polish 
Jewish leaders early that year, Chief Rabbi Dr. Rubenstein of Vilnius appealed 
to the Jewish world that “German Jewry’s calamity must not be allowed to 
overshadow the Polish Jewish catastrophe.”22 In the course of the following 
months more and more Jewish voices aligned with Rabbi Rubenstein’s 
message. A year later, the famous Communist Karl Radek, a former Comunist 
International member and now journalist, went even further saying that “what 
Poland is preparing for her Jewish population will exceed the cruelty of the 
German manifold.”23 
                                                 
17 Heller, On the Edge of Destruction, 77–139; Melzer, No Way Out, 39–94. 
18 Mendelsohn, The Jews of East Central Europe between the World Wars,74.  
19 Despair Faces Polish Jewry, Leaders Claim, Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 6 January 1935.  
20 Jakob Lestschinsky, Der wirtschaftliche Zusammenbruch der Juden in Deutschland und 
Polen, Paris/Geneva 1936, 3. Unless indicated otherwise, all translations from German into 
English are done by the author. 
21 Despair Faces Polish Jewry, Leaders Claim, Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 6 January 1935. 
22 Despair Faces Polish Jewry, Leaders Claim. 
23 Radek Holds Polish Treatment of Jews Worse Than Nazi, Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 
18 March 1936.  
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Not only did Polish or other Eastern European Jews deem their own 
situation more dangerous than that of their German brethren, but this 
perception took hold in Germany itself as well. The German-Jewish teacher 
Heinemann Stern described in his autobiography a conversation with a former 
student, who had just come back from a trip to Poland in 1936 or 1937. He 
was shocked by the terrible conditions that prevailed in Poland and finished 
his report to Stern with the words: “Compared to Poland, Germany is still a 
paradise today.”24 Similar opinions were expressed in those years by Franz 
Meyer, a leading official of the Zionist umbrella organization Zionistische 
Vereinigung für Deutschland, predicting that “the situation of the Jews in 
Poland will soon overshadow the Jewish situation in Germany,”25 by Zionist 
leader Chaim Weizmann,26 or, in May 1937, by Kurt Löwenstein, co-editor of 
the leading Zionist newspaper Jüdische Rundschau, who wrote: “Sure, the 
political conditions in which the Jews of Germany now live are of particular 
significance. Nonetheless, the social-economic misery of the Jews in some 
countries of the East is much worse.”27 
All this was not only public rhetoric to raise the awareness of the 
Western world, to put the German Jewish predicament into perspective or 
soothe the troubled German Jews. It was, above all, the outline of a global 
scenario that linked any solution for the German Jews to the fate of their 
Eastern European coreligionists. Those Jewish organizations and 
representatives in charge of upholding the global system of emigration 
assistance, which had been largely successful for more than fifty years, had to 
take this global scenario into account.28  
According to contemporary historian Aviva Halamish, until November 
1938, Zionist leaders of the Jewish Agency “widely conceived the situation of 
                                                 
24 Heinemann Stern, Warum hassen sie uns eigentlich? Jüdisches Leben zwischen den 
Kriegen. Erinnerungen, Düsseldorf 1970, 184.  
25 Reich Zionist Declares Situation of Polish Jews Will Overshadow German, Jewish 
Telegraphic Agency, 31 January 1936. 
26 Chaim Weizmann to Stephen S. Wise, 27 February 1936, in: Barnet Litvinoff (ed.), The 
Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann, vol. 17, Series A: August 1935–December 1936, ed. 
by Yemima Rosenthal, New Brunswick/Jerusalem 1979, 199–202, here 201.  
27 Kurt Löwenstein, Leben, nichts als leben!, in: Jüdische Rundschau 42, no. 40, 21 May 1937. 
28 The Jewish organization’s plans and policies concerning the emigration of the German Jews 
in the early 1930s are explored in David Jünger, Jahre der Ungewissheit. Emigrationspläne 
deutscher Juden 1933–1938, Göttingen/Bristol, Conn., 2016. 
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the Jews of Eastern Europe and particularly of Poland, as worse than that of 
their brethren in Germany.”29 Consequently, they assigned the very much 
needed immigration certificates of the category “Labour C” predominantly to 
Eastern European Jews.30 The total percentage of Germans among Jewish 
immigrants to Palestine – including those arriving on a “Capitalist A” 
immigration certificate without quota limitations – was 16 in 1934, 11 in 1935, 
27 in 1936 and 34 in 1937. Throughout the 1930s, Polish Jews also received 
more labour certificates than German Jews.31 Stephen S. Wise, President of 
the American Jewish Congress (AJC), was one of the most adamant and 
outspoken American Jewish adversaries of the Nazi regime. In March 1933 he 
predicted: “What is happening in Germany today may happen tomorrow in 
any other land on earth unless it is challenged and rebuked. It is not the 
German Jews who are being attacked. It is the Jews.”32 
With the despair growing in Poland and other Eastern European 
countries, his predictions seemed to come true. At the AJC’s national 
convention in late 1937, its Chairman, M. Maldwin Fertig, recapitulated the 
previous year’s efforts:  
 
“While previously our main concern on the European Continent had been with 
the fate of the half million Jews under the Nazi regime it now moved eastward 
toward the three and a quarter Million Jews in the resurrected Republic of 
Poland. Gradually the Polish crisis overshadowed the Nazi calamity […].”33 
 
                                                 
29 Aviva Halamish, Palestine as a Destination for Jewish Immigrants and Refugees from Nazi 
Germany, in: Caestecker/Moore (eds.), Refugees from Nazi Germany and the Liberal 
European States, 122–150, here 127.  
30 The British Mandate authority regulated Jewish immigration through different immigration 
certificates. Certificate “Labour C” roughly pertained to people in working age and condition 
without financial means. The amount of those C-certificates was fixed and their allocation was 
entrusted to the Jewish Agency. Everyone being able to prove the possession of 1,000 pound 
sterling in free convertible currency could immigrate on a “Capitalist A” certificate. 
31 Ibid., 145.  
32 Cit. in Melvin I. Urofsky, A Voice That Spoke for Justice. The Life and Times of Stephen 
S. Wise, New York 1982, 265.  
33 American Jewish Historical Society Archives, New York, I-77: American Jewish Congress 
Records, Box 835: National Biennial Conventions, Folder 4: National Convention 1937, 
National Convention of the American Jewish Congress, held at Hotel Willard, New York, 
November 27 and 28, 1937.  
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The different doom scenarios hovering over the Jewish public of the 1930s led 
to a variety of emergency plans basically consisting of large scale emigration 
schemes. The evacuation plan of Vladimir Jabotinsky was the most prominent 
one. Having first voiced his ideas in the late 1920s, Jabotinsky introduced his 
rescue plan from “an unprecedented catastrophe”34 into the newly founded 
revisionist New Zionist Organization in 1935.35 This catastrophe was about to 
unfold in the whole of Europe, he predicted in his 1937 book The Jewish State, 
but Poland, from which hundreds of thousands of Jews needed to emigrate in 
order to mitigate or slow down the inevitable, would be its center.36 His 
proclaimed goal was to resettle 1,5 million Jews in Palestine within ten years: 
700,000 from Poland, 200,000 from Romania, 200,000 from Germany, 50,000 
from Lithuania, and 350,000 from other countries.37 Throughout the 1930s, 
until he officially abandoned his plan in 1939, those proportions remained 
largely unchanged, and at no point were the German Jews central to his 
considerations.38 It is crucial to have this perception of priorities in mind in 
order to understand the migration setting of German Jews in the 1930s. 
Different Jewish sources gave different figures of how many European Jews 
were in jeopardy – two, five or six million39 – but there was an unanimous 
understanding that a solution to the threat of Jewish existence in Europe had to 
encompass first and foremost Eastern European Jewries, and Germans only in 
second place. 
                                                 
34 Wladimir Jabotinsky, Der Judenstaat [1937], Vienna 1938, 17.  
35 For the genesis of the evacuation plan, see Marcus, Social and Political History of the Jews 
in Poland, 1919–1939, 396–401; Dan Michman, Holocaust Historiography. A Jewish 
Perspective. Conceptualizations, Terminology, Approaches and Fundamental Issues, London 
et al. 2003, 205–216; Joseph B. Schechtman, The Vladimir Jabotinsky Story, vol. 2: Fighter 
and Prophet. The Last Years, New York et al. 1961, 334–363; Jabotinsky, Der Judenstaat; 
idem, The War and the Jews, New York 1942.  
36 Ibid., 58.  
37 Ibid.  
38 Michman, Holocaust Historiography, 205–216. Michman speaks out against a popular claim 
that Jabotinsky anticipated the destruction of the European Jews by Nazi Germany and was 
the first to work on their rescue.  
39 Whereas Jabotinsky spoke of 1,5 million, the German Zionist Max Apt thought of between 
two and 3,5 million. The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (Joint) even expected 
five million and Arthur Prinz six million Jews, who would need to be rescued. Max Apt, 
Konstruktive Auswanderungspolitik. Ein Beitrag zur jüdischen Überseekolonisation, Berlin 
1936, 9 and 14; Arthur Prinz, Voraussetzungen jüdischer Auswanderungspolitik, in: Der 
Morgen 12, no. 1, April 1936. For Joint’s figures, see JDC and Polish Jewry, in: Jewish 
Telegrahic Agency, 8 January 1935.  
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Looking for destinations that could provide a political, religious and 
economic shelter for the tormented Jews of Europe proved to be a disaster of a 
different kind. The era of mass migration had not only produced millions of 
refugees, but had prompted many countries all over the world to tighten their 
immigration regulations. Most dramatic was the retreat of the United States 
from its pivotal role as a haven for the oppressed and impoverished. The US 
immigration laws of 1921 and 1924 practically closed the door for future 
European immigrants.40 Likewise, the possibilities of settling in other 
European countries shrank, as the desire to keep refugees out of local job 
markets began to outweigh the continent’s principle of freedom of 
movement.41  
Jewish Palestine, which some Jewish representatives like Vladimir 
Jabotinsky hoped would become the home for the majority of European Jews 
in distress, was in the 1930s far from offering a durable solution. To the 
contrary, in the period between the late 1920s and the 1930s, the Zionist 
project faced its greatest crisis since Jewish colonization of Palestine had 
begun some decades before. The Zionist Organization basically lacked the 
support of the diaspora Jews – ideologically as well as financially. 
Immigration figures were also low. Between 1926 and 1928, more Jews left 
than immigrated to Palestine. After failing to settle into the new place, fifteen 
thousand Jews, or 74 percent of the immigrants of 1926 and 1927, eventually 
returned to their former homes.42 As historian Tom Segev noted, “a sense of 
despair” – economic and social – spread throughout the country,43 which was 
followed by open violence: After anti-Jewish pogroms in Hebron and other 
towns and villages in 1929, and an investigation of possible reasons and 
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counter-strategies a year later, the British mandatory power published the 
second White Paper, which curtailed Jewish immigration to Palestine.44 
From today’s perspective, despite all ups and downs, the development 
of Jewish Palestine towards the foundation of the State of Israel in 1948 seems 
a rather steady one. This perspective is deceptive though, as the colonization 
project was constantly overhung with possible collapse during the 1920s and 
1930s.45 The Jewish Agency was preoccupied with the economic crisis in 
Palestine, with repelling the attacks of the revisionist movement and the 
increasing tensions with the Arab population. The Arab uprising, beginning in 
1936, led to an almost complete stop of Jewish immigration as per the British 
White Paper of 1939.46 Among German Zionist leaders, belief in Palestine and 
its capacity to take in any more German Jews was fading. In early 1936, the 
head of the German Palestine Office, Arthur Prinz, invoked the “inadequacy of 
Palestine as a place of immigration” and claimed that “although Palestine has 
a unique and indispensable meaning for the renewal of Judaism it does not at 
all offer a comprehensive solution for the Jewish problem.”47  
The Jewish leaders had to reckon with the global increase on Jewish 
migration and the limited actions of immigration destinations when they 
envisioned emigration schemes for the German Jews. Prinz described a 
possible scenario resulting from this circumstance as “tremendous 
destabilization of the Jewish situation not only in Germany but also in Poland, 
Romania, Austria, Hungary and other countries – actually in more or less the 
entire area between the Baltic Sea and the Aegean Sea, the Russian Western 
border and the Rhine inhabited by six million Jews.”48 
Since the political, and even more so the economic situation of 
(Jewish) refugees in Europe was devastating, the choices for German Jews 
were very limited. Nothing can demonstrate this more impressively than the 
return of Jewish migrants to Nazi Germany. In late 1934 and throughout 1935, 
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thousands of Jews, who had left Germany after 30 January 1933, returned 
from exile to their former homes. The reasons for the immigrants to return 
varied widely, but most of them had faced harsh economic conditions, 
frequently very unwelcoming immigration laws and regulations in their host 
countries, and huge difficulties to adapt culturally and linguistically to their 
new surroundings. To them, future prospects in Germany seemed still to be 
better than living under utmost precarious conditions in France, the 
Netherlands, Great Britain or Czechoslovakia.49  
With all this in mind, it becomes obvious that the Jewish situation in 
Germany and all questions of Jewish emigration after 1933 were not defined 
by Germany alone. They were rather part and parcel of a much bigger setting, 
namely the era of mass migration and the deterioration of the Jewish status on 
a European and even global scale. 
The Temporal Shift: Challenges of the Emancipation Era 
Even though the political and economic situation of European Jews was 
appalling in the early 1930s, and the rise of the Nazis to the highest ranks of 
German politics to be expected, the appointment of Adolf Hitler as Reich 
Chancellor on 30 January 1933 still came as a shock to many. It was the first 
time that an outspoken anti-Semite gained power in a state of the Western 
hemisphere.  
The immediate post-World War I period had been characterized by 
vicious allegations against the German Jews of which the so-called stab-in-
the-back myth was only the most prevalent one. Frequently, those allegations 
turned into open violence directed against the Jews, peaking in 1922 and 1923 
with the assassination of Walther Rathenau and anti-Jewish pogroms in the 
Berlin Scheunenviertel respectively.50 The so-called “golden twenties,” 
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between 1924 and 1929, proved to be comparably peaceful, both for Jews and 
the Weimar Republic in general. However, this relative quiet came to an end 
again shortly after, as Jews saw their legal status questioned, their political 
influence diminished, and themselves subjected to even more frequent and 
violent anti-Semitic proclamations. After 1929, the Nazi movement grew 
stronger every year, while the decline of liberal forces was a disastrous loss for 
the Jews.51  
Against this background, matters such as the future of Jewish 
emancipation and the survival of German Jewry were vividly discussed by the 
Jewish public. Depending on which ideological or religious camp the 
respective participant belonged to, the proposed solutions differed. In those 
debates, four major camps may be identified: the German-national, the liberal, 
the Zionist, and finally the religious, observant or Orthodox Jews.52 The 
German-national Jews claimed that full emancipation could only be 
accomplished if German Jews relinquished any Jewish particularity, pledged 
full allegiance to the German nation and transformed Judaism into a solely 
private matter with almost no other meaning than domestic customs.53 The 
liberal Jews agreed with the call for German nationalism, but opposed what 
they perceived as a dilution of Judaism. In their understanding, the bond 
between “Germanness” and “Jewishness” – Deutschtum and Judentum – as 
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two sides of the same coin needed to be upheld.54 The Zionists, however, 
deemed the way Jewish emancipation had unfolded a failure. In their eyes, 
Jews remained Jews, no matter how desperate their efforts to be respected as 
Germans. The Jewish question, Zionists were sure, would only be solved if 
Jews stopped to disguise themselves as Germans – as they depicted it – and 
confessed to their Jewishness without reservation.55 Observant and Orthodox 
Jews likewise disparaged the development of Jewish emancipation. But unlike 
the Zionists, they believed that only an unrestricted return – teschuwoh – to the 
eternal and indisputable foundations of Judaism could remedy the current 
Jewish predicament.56  
As Jewish emancipation as a whole seemed to be at stake, almost all 
voices of this debate located the problems of the late 1920s and early 1930s 
within the larger context of the emancipation era, and used it as their main 
reference point. In the late eighteenth century, this new era had been heralded 
by the works of Moses Mendelsohn, the emergence of the Haskala and by the 
French Revolution in 1789.57 But the path to full emancipation turned out to 
be a twisted one, uncertain to be ever completed. Almost a hundred years after 
the French, German Jews were granted full equality before the law following 
German unification in 1871. However, they continued to be denied social 
equality. Moreover, with the rise of political anti-Semitism since the 1880s, 
the revocation of legal equality became a permanent threat. Ultimately, the 
fulfillment of Jewish emancipation and therefore equality in all spheres of life 
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became the primary goal for most German Jews, even though the emerging 
Zionist and Orthodox camps had different aspirations, or rather a different 
understanding of what emancipation should mean. 
Given this background, it is not surprising that the events of the 1920s 
and 1930s were interpreted by Jewish contemporaries as only a continuation, 
or intensification of a long-lasting problem – the struggle for emancipation – 
traceable all the way back to Moses Mendelsohn.58 In the late 1920s, almost 
150 years after Mendelsohn’s death in 1786, the whole emancipation project 
seemed to be at a crossroads. Not only could social equality not been attained 
for Jews, but legal equality was also called into question. Finally, the year 
1932 was expected to bring the decision about the future of Jewish 
emancipation and was proclaimed at its outset as Entscheidungsjahr (year of 
decisions).59 In January, at a general meeting of the Centralverein deutscher 
Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens, Chairman Ludwig Holländer predicted: 
 
“The year 1932 will bring about the decision […] whether the ever increasing 
demands of the anti-Semites for the disenfranchisement of the Jewish part of 
the people in Germany will be partly or completely fulfilled. And it will bring 
about the decision whether we German Jews will be degraded to second class 
citizens.”60 
 
To follow Ludwig Holländer, it was not a question whether the civil rights of 
Jews would be curtailed, but rather to what extent. Then, the appointment of 
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Adolf Hitler as Reich Chancellor was a worrisome event, but still one that was 
thought to be in line with the long history of ups and downs of the Jewish 
struggle for emancipation. Surely, the violence of the first months against 
Communists, Socialists, Unionists or intellectuals, the anti-Jewish boycott of 
1 April 1933 and the Civil Service Law of 7 April 1933 were indications that 
the new government was much more dangerous than any previous regime. 
“Sternly and concerned, the German Jews look into the future,” Holländer 
wrote on 2 February 1933, and further: “It does not make sense to disguise the 
dangers inherent in the fact that the leading men of a party, which champions 
the fight against the Jews, is now in control of German politics.”61 Similar 
views were expressed in the Jüdische Rundschau and the Israelit, the most 
widely read newspapers of the Zionist and (Neo-)Orthodox camps 
respectively, whose authors emphasized that the danger of the first ever 
explicitly anti-Semitic German Government must not be underestimated.62 
However, the overall context, that is, the general validity of 
emancipation, seemed to be unchanged.63 Even though it is impossible to 
make a generalized statement about the responses of the Jewish public to the 
Nazi regime’s rise to power, some broader observations are still possible. 
Whereas after 30 January 1933 most commentators expressed their belief in 
the inviolability of the fundamental civil rights of German Jews,64 this belief 
was shattered by the passing of the Civil Service Law of 7 April 1933. With 
Jewish legal rights largely revoked by this law, Zionist, Orthodox and even 
many liberal Jews assumed the era of emancipation had come to an end.65 But 
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not everyone was entirely pessimistic: Alfred Hirschberg, editor-in-chief of 
the Central-Verein-Zeitung, mused that the end of one era could also mean the 
beginning of a new one.66 This was a view shared rather by Zionist and 
Orthodox Jews and less by the Centralverein’s supporters,67 although the 
classification of any voice as representative of one camp or the other would be 
misleading. Of much greater interest, though, is the fact that the emancipation 
era remained the predominant reference point for all factions of German 
Jewry. Most commentators agreed that the “old emancipation” had vanished, 
and something new had to follow. However, what was seen as new was in 
most cases a variation, or at least reminiscence, of the old. Those concepts 
encompassed “group emancipation” versus the “emancipation of the 
individual,”68 “new” versus “old emancipation,”69 “external” versus “internal 
emancipation,”70 “dissimilation,”71 “second emancipation”72 and so forth.73 
All those ideas linked future prospects to the past, referring to terms, concepts 
and notions that had been used and developed since the outset of the 
emancipation era. 
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Especially between 1933 and 1935, many history books were published 
addressing the history of German, but also European or global Jewry.74 Their 
authors, such as the hereinafter-quoted Rabbi Joachim Prinz, expressed their 
wish “to enhance the understanding of the presence by looking back at the 
past, because only the understanding of what we used to be […] provides us 
with the strength to walk on our new path.”75 Accordingly, the subtitle of 
Prinz’ book Wir Juden reads Besinnung, Rückblick, Zukunft (Reflection, 
Retrospection, Future). While generally a harsh critic of Prinz, the German 
national theologian Hans Joachim Schoeps in the main concurred with the 
former’s invocation of the past: “German Jews are in a crisis today. […] We 
need to reflect ourselves, who we are, where we are from and where we go 
to.”76 The famous historian Ismar Elbogen, as well, agreed when he wrote:  
 
“Let us remember the history of our fathers, who time and again experienced 
such catastrophes and still did not give up their will to live! They have 
adamantly sought and found means and ways to preserve themselves. […] Our 
fathers have borne their destiny with heroism, with dignity, and in observant 
faith. Let us learn from them.”77  
 
Understanding the presence by looking back at the past to master the future – 
this was quite a common strategy in those days. Shortly after the anti-Jewish 
boycott of 1 April 1933, journalist Robert Weltsch published an article titled 
Wear the Yellow Badge with Pride, which became one of the most notorious 
Jewish responses to the early Nazi regime. By trying to convert the 
connotation of a social stigma into something percieved as positive, Weltsch 
sought to counteract the Nazis‘ attacks on Jews. The closing remarks of this 
article read:  
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“The Jewish answer is clear. It is the brief sentence spoken by the prophet 
Jonah: Ivri anochi, I am a Hebrew. Yes, a Jew. The affirmation of our 
Jewishness – this is the moral significance of what is happening today. […] As 
for us Jews, we can defend our honor. We remember all those who were called 
Jews, stigmatized as Jews, over a period of five thousand years. We are being 
reminded that we are Jews. We affirm this and bear it with pride.”78  
 
Many Jews would follow his understanding in subsequent years when facing 
their plight, and the perception of effectiveness of this approach was nourished 
by the Nazi policies. In almost every sphere of German life and all across the 
country, authorities suppressed free speech, persecuted the Left, and abolished 
democratic structures. They did, however, spare the Jewish community as a 
religious entity – at least initially. Jewish newspapers continued to publish 
without direct state censorship; most Jewish organizations continued to work 
permitted to retain democratic structures; and Jewish religious institutions 
remained largely untroubled by state interference. Jews as individuals were 
physically attacked, humiliated, and removed from the workplace, but German 
Jewry as a religious community was hardly touched.79 
This was the setting in which different ideas of a Jewish future in 
Germany flourished. The anti-Jewish politics of the Nazi regime combined 
with a Jewish response as per Weltsch sparked a revival of Jewish cultural and 
communal life that lasted until at least 1935, if not longer, as some 
contemporaries later suggested.80 For those reasons, Jewish – especially 
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institutional and religious – life of the 1930s has been described as a period of 
Jewish autonomy or even as a democratic island within Nazified Germany.81  
When finally, in late 1935, the Nuremberg Laws revoked Jewish legal 
equality and declared Jews second-class state members as compared to 
German Reich citizens, the predictions of 1932 seemed to have come true: The 
era of emancipation had come to an end.82 Nevertheless did the stipulations of 
the Nuremberg laws, combined with the aforementioned cultural and 
institutional autonomy granted by authorities, nourish hopes that, at least, the 
ultimate goal of the Nazi regime regarding the Jews had been accomplished – 
the absolute separation of the Jewish from the German Volk – and would go no 
further. Following the statements of several Nazi officials right after the 
promulgation of the Laws, Jews were also led to believe that as a recognized 
national minority, they would enjoy distinctive rights: minority rights.83 
Especially a comment by Alfred-Ingemar Berndt, the chief editor of the 
official news agency Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro, was cited in many Jewish 
publications. Referring to the Zionist Congress that had been convened 
recently in Lucerne, he wrote: “Today, Germany accommodates the claims of 
the international Zionist Congress, when it makes the Jews living in Germany 
a national minority. By making Jewry a national minority, it will again be 
possible to establish a normal relationship between Germans and Jews.”84 
His projection of a “normal relationship” between Germans and Jews 
and the introduction of the term “minority” were indeed remarkable. The 
minority status was nothing any of the different camps of German Jewry had 
wanted; but Jewish experiences as minorities, in the pre-emancipation era as 
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well as, contemporarily, in some of the Eastern and South Eastern European 
states, gave good reason to believe that the new situation would be 
manageable. Thus, the perception prevailed that while German Jews had been 
deprived of their individual civil rights, they were now granted rights as 
national group, and Jewish life in Germany would hopefully continue.85 The 
analysis of the Jüdische Allgemeine Zeitung was characteristic of the debate in 
the Jewish public shortly after the promulgation of the Laws:  
 
“The Nuremberg laws have fully completed the detachment of the Jews from 
the German Volksgemeinschaft. […] Those laws put an end to an epoch of 
about 125 years. […] We are standing not only at the beginning of a new year 
but also of a new future. We must look forward to the reconstruction of Jewish 
life within the now defined legal limits. […] The new state […] wants to 
provide the Jewish minority with a living and economic space, in which it can 
live and moreover, in which our children can grow up as honest and self-
confident human beings.”86  
 
Against the backdrop of these public deliberations and expectations, it 
becomes understandable that emigration was not many people’s preferred 
option. Of course, tens of thousands of Jews left Germany every year;87 but 
this remained an individual rather than collective solution, the latter staying 
out of consideration. The change of legal status from individual to exclusive 
group rights could not be fully grasped in its consequences. Most importantly: 
the overall framework of the continuing struggle for Jewish emancipation in 
Germany did not change for any of the Jewish fractions. Until around 1937, 
German Jewry continued to respond to the ongoing crisis roughly the same 
way as they had prior to the Nazi regime’s coming into power, since they 
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sought to explain the present in terms and ideas that derived from a slowly but 
inevitably vanishing world.88 In short, with that framework valid in the minds 
of many Jews, emigration was not an acceptable collective solution. For the 
German-national and the liberal Jews, emigration would have meant to 
surrender emancipation in general and to loosen the bond between 
Germanness and Jewishness and, thus, to give up everything they, their 
parents and ancestors had been fighting for. This was hardly thinkable. Hans 
Joachim Schoeps concluded at the time:  
 
“We German Jews have been living for hundreds of years on German lands, 
we know and confess that no mundane power can rip Germany out of our 
hearts, that no law and no decree can release us from our duty for volk and 
fatherland. […] Foremost, we must make sure that we do not perish. To the 
contrary, in defiance of the false prophets who propose to us emigration or a 
cultural ghetto, we must endure in pride and dignity despite the utmost limited 
material living conditions.”89  
 
Nor was emigration a solution for the Zionist camp. The establishment of a 
viable Jewish homeland seemed far off, the project of an unforeseeable future, 
planned to be a remedy for the plight of Eastern European, rather than Western 
Jewry.90 Palestine’s capacity to absorb immigrants was fairly low in the 1930s, 
not least due to the severe immigration restrictions imposed by the British 
authorities in the wake of the 1636 riots. Then again, Jewish emigration to 
destinations other than Palestine seemed to involve the severe risk of 
dispersion of the Jews and possible disintegration of the Jewish people.91 To 
the German Zionists, Zionism meant Jewish nationalism, but on German soil. 
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Emigration would have meant to abandon their understanding of the Jewish 
people as a nation within or by the side of the German nation. Therefore, 
Weltsch’s article Wear the Yellow Badge with Pride, was decisive for the 
Zionist objectives of subsequent years: the consolidation of the Jewish people 
in Germany, and the restoration of Jewish self-confidence accompanied by a 
cautious building-up of Jewish Palestine. However, Weltsch’s optimism 
proved to be ill-founded, requiring the Zionists to modify their strategy and 
objectives after 1935. Nonetheless, the continuation of Jewish life in Germany 
remained their primary goal. Right after the promulgation of the Nuremberg 
Laws, Kurt Löwenstein wrote that the Zionist program “is based on the 
conviction that it is necessary to ensure the material existence of the Jews 
living in Germany and to enable them to live in dignity. […] In addition, it 
recognizes the fact that the reduction of the Jewish substance by organized 
emigration – that must primarily lead to Palestine – complements this first 
point.”92 The Zionists faced a predicament: Even though the Jewish situation 
in Germany turned out to be all but promising, neither Palestine nor other 
emigration destinations offered any adequate solution. Within the leadership 
of the Zionistische Vereinigung für Deutschland, it was first and foremost 
Arthur Prinz who was serious about the adoption of a Zionist emigration 
policy. It was not until 1936 that the rest of the Zionist leadership yielded to 
his unremitting calls and agreed to the inevitability of an emigration policy, 
which they then implemented slowly.93  
Finally, observant and Orthodox Jews excluded emigration as an 
option, as under the halachic rule dina de-malkhuta dina (the law of the 
land/kingdom is law) subordination under the mundane power was a sacred 
duty. For them, it hardly mattered where they would endure the lot of exile, in 
                                                 
92 Kurt Löwenstein, Das Programm, in: Jüdische Rundschau 40, no. 77, 24 September 1935.  
93 Arthur Prinz, Die Erkenntnisse der Judenfrage als Aufgabe unserer Generation, in: Der 
jüdische Wille 3 (April 1935), no. 3; idem, Das Problem der Emigration, in: Jüdische 
Rundschau 40, no. 77, 24 September 1935; idem, Voraussetzungen jüdischer 
Auswanderungspolitik; Arthur Prinz, Thesen zur Wanderungsfrage, in: Der Morgen 12 
(Dezember 1936), no. 9; idem, Jüdische Wanderungspolitik heute und morgen, in: Der 
Morgen 13 (May 1937), no. 2. 
26 
 
Germany or any other country.94 Rabbi Simon Schwab, who would later gain 
fame as rabbi of New York’s German-Jewish neighborhood Washington 
Heights, where he served from the late 1950s through the 1990s, commented 
on the state of Germany in 1933, when he was only 25 years old, in rather 
lofty words:  
 
“Menacing thunderclouds have gathered over the German Jews. […] The grey 
evening shadows of the golus yield to the night. It has become dark around us. 
For hundreds of years, German Jewry has known the frosty night breeze 
[Nachthauch] of the golus only from afar, but has never experienced it up 
close. […] A fervent wave of teschuwo should flood over Germany’s Jews. To 
resist the distress is futile, to learn from it – that is the slogan. Let us bear the 
golus, as proud Jews!”95 
 
Apart from those rather abstract considerations, Jewish religious life did not 
face severe restrictions at the time. The daily life of Orthodox communities 
felt less affected by what was happening in the rest of Nazi Germany. The 
historian Avraham Barkai, who grew up in a neo-Orthodox community in the 
Berlin Scheunenviertel in the 1930s, recorded in his memoirs:  
 
“A sheltered childhood and carefree adolescence was a rarity in this 
environment, even rarer for Jewish children after 1933. […] However, in 
general, I was lucky that I was spared from violence against me and anti-
Semitic persecution, which most of my Jewish peers were exposed to. From 
my first to my last school year, I attended Jewish schools and spent the 
afternoons in a protected Jewish environment […].”96  
 
Mally Dienemann, the wife of the Offenbach Rabbi Max Dienemann, had a 
similar experience: “Despite the barrage of propaganda fire against the Jews 
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[…] in Offenbach, one personally remained undisturbed until the end of 
1938.”97  
As mentioned before, the reactions of the different Jewish groups, 
organizations and individuals towards the Nazi onslaught were very diverse 
and cannot be presented in a generalized manner. However, almost all of them 
were based on the same premise: What they believed was at stake, was the 
history and legacy of Jewish emancipation. Against this background, it 
becomes clear that emigration was not the biggest concern, even though it 
became more prevalent towards 1937 and early 1938. To put it bluntly: Until 
the end of 1937, the majority of the German Jews seemed to see no need for 
emigration.  
What has been outlined so far remained the major frame of reference 
for German Jews until 1937. During this time, and even more so the following 
year, circumstances changed rapidly. Due to the unremitting deterioration of 
the legal status and economic situation of the Jews, emigration ultimately 
became the absolute focus of Jewish efforts and most haunting endeavor. An 
increasing number of German Jews considered to emigrate and began 
preparations to do so. But again, those preparations progressed deliberately 
slowly, as people were under the impression that there would be sufficient 
time to settle matters and emigrate in an orderly manner. They could not keep 
pace with the dramatic developments after 1937. When, by the end of 1938, 
leaving Germany had become the only option for Jews, emigration was more 
difficult than ever before as most countries had closed their borders to Jewish 
refugees. 
Summary: The Complexity of Jewish Emigration before 1938 
The history of Jewish emigration from Germany in the 1930s is overshadowed 
and blurred by the subsequent events that ultimately led to the Holocaust. Due 
to the magnitude of the mass murder, all events before and afterwards seem to 
be related: as the pre- or post-history of the Holocaust. All questions as to how 
this could have been prevented or how more Jews could have been saved from 
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annihilation are understandable and justified. Nonetheless, they can also limit 
the understanding of major developments and crucial questions of the period 
itself, in which the coming catastrophe could not be anticipated. 
In his article on coping strategies in the context of Jewish history, Dan 
Michman argues to this effect:  
 
“All things considered, the reactions of the Jews towards persecution but also 
their survival strategies were disparate and manifold. However, they were 
always a crucial part of the varying forms of Jewish life as they had developed 
in earlier days. The reasons why Jews decided to act in one way or another can 
only be fully understood within this broader context.”98 
 
Looking at emigration challenges of German Jews in the 1930s, the entire 
setting should likewise be detached from familiar temporal as well as spatial 
limitations. Dwelling on the Holocaust or on Nazi German history between 
1933 and 1945 as dominant reference points constricts the perspective on the 
migration setting of German Jews in the 1930s. It limits our understanding of 
the period and bears the risk that major developments might be overlooked. To 
obtain a more comprehensive and precise picture, we need to broaden our 
view. As proposed in this article, the inclusion of the pre-conditions of 
migration against the background of the global migration regime and the larger 
history of Jewish emancipation long before 1933, can enhance our 
understanding about the German-Jewish 1930s and the migration setting for 
German Jews. 
Taking a much broader approach to German-Jewish migration in the 
interwar period, Hagit Lavsky, very similarly, concludes in her study on the 
Creation of the German-Jewish Diaspora:  
 
“Until 1938 German Jews calculated their options between going and staying 
as potential emigrants, who are still able to rationally evaluate the pros and 
cons, timing and destination for their move, not as refugees who had no 
choice. Beyond that, they regarded the prospects of time left to get organized 
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for even a transitional existence in Germany as much longer than it turned out 
to be in reality.”99 
 
As this article has demonstrated, the notions of “flight” and “rescue” do not do 
the complex patterns of experience of the German Jews before 1938 justice. 
The escalation of the political setting did not necessarily evoke a sense of 
urgency in the organization of migration. Therefore, this article argues that the 
notions and categories usually applied to the reconstruction of the migration 
setting before the crucial year of 1938 have to be reevaluated. In order to fully 
comprehend the Jewish 1930s, the Jewish emancipation era and its stages of 
transformation, as well as the migration conditions on a global scale need to be 
taken into account.  
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